Australia’s other “irrelevant”
Crimes against Humanity.
[The short link URL for this posting is: http://wp.me/p1n8TZ-zk ]
The invasion of Iraq was never ever justified as these Pearls of Truth from the English Parliament’s July 6th 2016 Iraq Inquiry, i.e. the Chilcot Report – Executive Summary, make very, very clear:
573. …the [US] Intelligence Community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. This was a major intelligence failure.
574. The evidence in Section 4.4 shows that, after the invasion, the UK Government, including the intelligence community, was reluctant to admit, and to recognise publicly, the mounting evidence that there had been failings in the UK’s pre-conflict collection, validation, analysis and presentation of intelligence on Iraq’s WMD.
576. Almost immediately after the start of the invasion, UK Ministers and officials sought to lower public expectations of immediate or significant finds of WMD in Iraq.
The lack of evidence to support pre-conflict claims about Iraq’s WMD challenged the credibility of the Government and the intelligence community, and the legitimacy of the war.
The Government and the intelligence community were both concerned about the consequences of the presentational aspects of their pre-war assessments being discredited.
Although the UK expected to be involved in Iraq for a lengthy period after the conflict, the Government was unprepared for the role in which the UK found itself from April 2003. Much of what went wrong stemmed from that lack of preparation.
In any undertaking of this kind, certain fundamental elements are of vital importance:
the best possible appreciation of the theatre of operations, including the political, cultural and ethnic background, and the state of society, the economy and infrastructure;
a hard-headed assessment of risks;
objectives which are realistic within that context, and if necessary limited – rather than idealistic and based on optimistic assumptions; and
allocation of the resources necessary for the task – both military and civil.
All of these elements were lacking in the UK’s approach to its role inpost-conflict Iraq.
Ground truth is vital. Over-optimistic assessments lead to bad decisions. Senior decision-makers – Ministers, Chiefs of Staff, senior officials – must have a flow of accurate and frank reporting.
A “can do” attitude is laudably ingrained in the UK Armed Forces – a determination to get on with the job, however difficult the circumstances – but this can prevent ground truth from reaching senior ears.
At times in Iraq, the bearers of bad tidings were not heard.
On several occasions, decision-makers visiting Iraq (including the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Chief of the General Staff) found the situation on the ground to be much worse than had been reported to them.
Effective audit mechanisms need to be used to counter optimism bias,whether through changes in the culture of reporting, use of multiple channels of information – internal and external – or use of visits.
“…In relation to Iraq, the risks involved in the parallel deployment of two enduring medium scale operations were not examined with sufficient rigour and challenge.
We were deceived, and as a consequence:
About 250,000 people, mostly civilians are dead, i.e. the ‘collateral damage so beloved of cowboy commanders who see the destruction of the enemy but fail to see the deaths of innocent men, women and children;
Islamic State poses a deadly threat to anyone, anywhere in the world;
The politicians responsible for the deaths of a quarter of a million people are not willing to accept accountability for what I consider to be Crimes against Humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
The decision as to whether or not President George Bush II(USA),Prime Minister Tony Blair (Britain), and Prime minister John Howard (Australia) should face criminal charges for the unauthorized invasion of Iraq is a matter for the United Nations who, in deciding, should look solely at the massive, constantly rising death toll from what was a politically motivated jingoistic act of military adventurism.
Australian Citizens take note:
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull had a powerful vested interest in holding the federal election on July 2nd, i.e. 4 days BEFORE the release of the Chilcot Report. Had he waited until the election was due in September, minor parties and independent candidates would have had a field day pointing out the macabre horrors and massive blunders being revealed in the Chilcot Report.
John Howard lied about having “irrefutable evidence” that Iraq had WMD’s and;
a quarter of million people, including some of us Aussies, have died because of those politically motivated lies.
These lies parallel the official viewpoint of Australia’s establishment, i.e. the Parliament, the Public Service, the police, the mass media, and even some individuals in the legal professions, that saving money is far more important than saving the lives of welfare recipients.
For this reason, I have linked the Chilcot Report to the Emcott Report which deals with Australia’s unreported, secretly classified, “irrelevant” welfare penalties murders.
Readers of this posting, especially Centrelink clients, such as Uni’ ot TAFE students, people on pensions, part-time workers on low incomes, and (soon to be) unemployed people, should check out these 4 videos:
CHILCOT REPORT ISSUES (and John Howard’s other lethal lies)
Waivergate – Part 1
Waivergate – Part 2
Waivergate – Part 3
(A Christian lay advocate for justice in Australia.)